Introduction
Why some countries are much poorer than others is one of the oldest questions in social science. It will also be one of the most challenging and important questions in the next several decades. This is for several reasons. First, despite spectacular growth in per capita incomes in much of the world during the 20th century, the gaps between rich and poor countries, rather than abating, have expanded. This pattern is challenging to most of our theories because many of the barriers to the spread of prosperity have disappeared: ideas travel around the world almost instantaneously, and any nation should today be able to easily copy any economic or social practice that it wishes; various impediments to trade in goods and to financial flows and foreign direct investments have largely disappeared. But the wide gaps in incomes and living standards remain. Second, these gaps have meant that while the rich world has become richer, poverty, disease and social injustice are still widespread in many parts of the world, notably in much of sub-Saharan Africa, in parts of South Asia and in various pockets of poverty in the Caribbean and Central America.
Challenging though these issues may be, we are now much better equipped to understand, and perhaps work towards redressing, the causes of these widespread disparities. Much of the progress on this issue has been made in economics (see Acemoglu, 2009 , for an overview), but the next step will require us to combine the insights and tools developed in economics with perspectives from other social sciences.
From proximate to fundamental causes
Economic analysis has documented that differences in per capita incomes and prosperity across countries are related to differences in human capital, physical capital and technology. We understand the extent to which differences in the quantity and quality of education, differences in the availability of machines, and the differences in the use of new technologies and the allocation of resources between activities with different levels of productivity contribute to incomes. We also understand how the current large differences in prosperity have resulted from lack of steady growth in many parts of the world, while other nations achieved sustained growth. But these are only proximate causes in the sense that they pose the next question: why some countries have less human capital, physical capital and technology and make worse use of their factors and opportunities. This has motivated economists and social scientists more broadly to look for potential fundamental causes. Here research and our understanding are still in their infancy. Institutions have emerged as a potential fundamental cause, contrasting, for example, with geographical differences or cultural factors (even as we recognize that cultural factors are central for understanding the evolution, and the persistence, of institutions). Institutional differences, associated with differences in the organization of society, shape economic and political incentives and affect the nature of economic equilibria via these channels. There is now vibrant theoretical and empirical research documenting the importance of institutions for economic outcomes. But the next stage, which requires an understanding of which specific configurations of institutions are most likely to encourage growth in the decades to come, why institutions differ across countries, and why they change, and why they often fail to change, is more challenging.
Institutions
Douglass North (1990, p. 3) offers the following definition: "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." Three important features of institutions are apparent in this definition: (1) they are "humanly devised," which contrasts with other potential fundamental causes, like geographic factors, which are outside human control; (2) they are "the rules of the game" setting "constraints" on human behavior; (3) their major effect will be through incentives.
The notion that incentives matter is second nature to economists, and institutions, as a key determinant of incentives, should have a major effect on economic outcomes, including economic development, growth, inequality and poverty. But if institutions matter so much for economic outcomes, shaping why some countries have incomes per capita 30 or 40 times greater than those of others, why do many societies choose institutions that are inimical to economic growth?
To think about possible answers to these questions, it is useful to consider the relationship between three institutional characteristics: (1) economic institutions; (2) political power; (3) political institutions. Economic institutions matter for economic growth because they shape the incentives of key economic actors in society, in particular, they influence investments in physical and human capital and technology, and the organization of production. Economic institutions not only determine the aggregate economic growth potential of the economy, but also the distribution of resources in the society. Herein lies part of the problem: different institutions will not only be associated with different degrees of efficiency and potential for economic growth, but also with different distribution of the gains across different individuals and social groups.
How are economic institutions determined? Although various factors play a role here, including history and chance, economic institutions are collective choices and because of their influence on the distribution of economic gains, not all individuals and groups prefer the same set of economic institutions, and often, many will prefer to maintain economic institutions that do not maximize the growth potential of a nation. This leads to a conflict of interest among various groups and individuals over the choice of economic institutions, and the political power of the different groups will be the deciding factor.
The distribution of political power in society is also endogenous. To make more progress here, let us distinguish between two components of political power; de jure (formal) and de facto political power (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) . De jure political power refers to power that originates from the political institutions in society. Political institutions, similar to economic institutions, determine the constraints on and the incentives of the key actors, but this time in the political sphere. Examples of political institutions include the form of government, for example, democracy vs. dictatorship or autocracy, and the extent of constraints on politicians and political elites.
A group of individuals, even if they are not allocated power by political institutions, may possess it; for example, they can revolt, use arms, hire mercenaries, co-opt the military, or undertake protests to impose their wishes on society. This type of de facto political power originates from both the ability to solve its collective action problems and from access to economic resources (which determines the capacity to use force against others).
This discussion highlights that we can think of political institutions and the distribution of economic resources in society as two state variables, affecting how political power will be distributed and how economic institutions will be chosen. An important notion is that of persistence; the distribution of resources and political institutions are relatively slow-changing and persistent. Since, like economic institutions, political institutions are collective choices, the distribution of political power in society is the key determinant of their evolution. This creates a central mechanism of persistence: political institutions allocate de jure political power, and those who hold political power influence the evolution of political institutions, and they will generally opt to maintain the political institutions that give them political power. A second mechanism of persistence comes from the distribution of resources: when a particular group is rich relative to others, this will increase its de facto political power and enable it to push for economic and political institutions favorable to its interests, reproducing the initial disparity. Despite these tendencies for persistence, the framework also emphasizes the potential for change. In particular, "shocks" to the balance of de facto political power, including changes in technologies and the international environment, have the potential to generate major changes in political institutions, and consequently in economic institutions and economic growth.
The challenges ahead
Despite much promising research, many fundamental and applied questions remain unanswered. However, recent research has shown how theoretical and empirical progress can be made on the effects of institutions and on the factors affecting institutional equilibria both at the national and sub-national levels. Major questions for future research include, among others:
• Why do institutions persist? Recent research has documented that several institutional features of current economies have historical roots going back several centuries or sometimes even more. There is also evidence that even after major institutional reforms, for example following the end of colonial rule in Latin America, Asia and Africa or the fall of military regimes, important institutional continuities remain. Despite the ideas on the sources of persistence mentioned above, we have only made limited progress in sources of persistence. These are partly in expectations and beliefs. The belief among the majority of US citizens that the Constitution safeguards their rights undoubtedly plays an important role in enabling the Constitution to do just that. But the citizens of many other countries do not hold similar beliefs and institutional outcomes are often very different. Yet appealing to such beliefs without understanding what the sources of these differential beliefs might be is not satisfactory, and theoretical and empirical investigation of various sources of institutional persistence, including the dynamics of political and social beliefs, remains a major area for future research.
• Though institutions persist, they are not historically predetermined. Major institutional reforms have taken place in many countries, and in some cases, as in Botswana, South Korea and China, such changes have altered the economic trajectories of nations fundamentally. What enables institutional reform? Why do many attempts at reform fail and even backfire? How can we work towards successful reforms? These questions are both academically interesting and central to inform policy debates. Despite their importance, we have little theory to guide us and few applied insights.
• While the role of secure property rights for investment and the importance of checks and balances in the political sphere for stability are well understood, we do not yet know which specific combinations of economic and political institutions are most conducive to economic growth. For example, the African evidence suggests that the weakness of the state is a major area of economic development, while during the early phases of the growth experiences of many East Asian nations the state was heavily involved in the economy. Yet this does not mean that greater state involvement is necessarily part of the cluster of institutions encouraging growth. Many pernicious dictatorships from North Korea to Burma highlight the dangers of allpowerful states. Despite much rhetoric on this topic, we currently do not know whether greater involvement of the state ensures a level playing field and facilitates economic development or whether it inexorably leads to insecure property rights and opens the way to more heightened political conflicts to control the all-powerful state. We also do not know which combinations of property rights, financial institutions, judicial institutions, education and various dimensions of social institutions are most conducive to economic development.
• Relatedly, we are also far from a consensus on the role of democracy and checks on political power in fostering an environment that is conducive to innovation and economic growth. Even though many of the economies spearheading economic growth over the last two centuries have been relatively democratic and many of the most disastrous economic performances have been under authoritarian regimes ranging from colonial rule to military dictatorships and personal rules, in the postwar era democratic countries do not have appreciably higher growth rates than nondemocratic ones. The rapid growth of China under a highly authoritarian regime has made some commentators conclude that authoritarian rule might be more conducive to economic growth. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think that authoritarian regimes will ultimately become incompatible with innovation and the creative destruction that accompanies most growth experiences. The extent to which this is the case and the various interactions between political regimes and economic growth are other major questions that will require much future research.
